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Three Questions about Sunspot Equilibria as 
an Explanation of Economic Fluctuations 
By MICHAEL WOODFORD* 
It is by now well known that the sort of 
difference equations that characterize the 
equilibrium conditions of an infinite horizon 
competitive economy may have solutions in 
which the endogenous variables fluctuate in 
response to "sunspot" variables, that is, to 
random events that in fact have nothing 
to do with economic "fundamentals," and 
so do not directly affect the equilibrium 
conditions. It is possible to view such 
"sunspot equilibria" as a representation of 
an actual phenomenon-economic fluctua- 
tions not caused by exogenous shocks to 
fundamentals, but rather by revisions of 
agents' expectations in response to some 
event, which revised expectations become 
self-fulfilling. 
Early discussions of such solutions some- 
times suggested that a more rigorous deriva- 
tion of the requirements for equilibrium 
might yield additional restrictions that would 
eliminate the sunspot solutions from the set 
of true equilibria. The demonstration by Karl 
Shell (1977), David Cass (1981), and Costas 
Azariadis (1981) that sunspot equilibria can 
exist in a rigorously formulated intertem- 
poral equilibrium model, namely the over- 
lapping generations model of Samuelson, has 
shown that this is not always the case. Nev- 
ertheless, many economists remain skeptical 
about the reasonableness of the sunspot hy- 
pothesis as a possible explanation of actual 
economic fluctuations, and for quite general 
reasons, independent of judgments about the 
empirical plausibility of any particular mod- 
els. I discuss here three such general reasons 
for skepticism. 
I. Are there Unexploited Profit Opportunities 
for Market Makers? 
One argument against the practical signifi- 
cance of sunspot equilibria is that their ex- 
istence is often linked to market incomplete- 
ness. It may be argued that, while the absence 
of markets for claims contingent upon 
sunspot realizations is not surprising in a 
world in which such events have no eco- 
nomic significance, if fluctuations of any size 
in response to sunspot realizations were to 
occur, this would provide an incentive for 
someone to organize such markets, and so 
suppress the fluctuating equilibria. 
A complete set of Arrow-Debreu mar- 
kets would indeed rule out sunspot equi- 
libria, under quite general assumptions (Yves 
Balasko, 1983). For example, in an exchange 
economy of the kind considered by Shell, 
Cass, and Azariadis, if a sunspot equilibrium 
exists, an allocation that would give each 
agent in some period t the mean of the 
vector of goods received in the sunspot allo- 
cation, and that coincides with the sunspot 
allocation in all other periods, must also be 
feasible. If agents are risk averse, the alter- 
native allocation increases the expected util- 
ity of all agents who consume in period t, 
while not affecting that of any other agents. 
But then at any set of Arrow-Debreu prices, 
the mean allocation for at least one agent 
must cost no more than his sunspot allo- 
cation, and so the sunspot allocation cannot 
be an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. (The ex- 
ample of Cass, showing that sunspot equi- 
libria are possible in an overlapping gen- 
erations exchange economy with complete 
contingent claims markets, depends upon all 
agents having linear utility functions.) 
One answer to the objection that markets 
should open in the event that sunspot 
fluctuations occur is given by Azariadis: there 
are very many possible random variables 
that could play the role of sunspots, and if 
markets are opened to neutralize certain of 
these variables, equilibrium fluctuations may 
be coordinated instead by another variable 
for which there are no contingent claims 
markets. But this is not particularly satisfac- 
tory, since (as discussed below) there must 
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be some reason for all agents to simulta- 
neously come to expect a particular sunspot 
variable to matter, and one may well sup- 
pose that anything that serves to render a 
particular variable sufficiently salient for this 
purpose can equally well predispose financial 
innovators to establish a market for exactly 
that sort of contingent claim. 
A more satisfactory reply would observe 
that the kind of trading in contingent claims 
that rules out the sunspot equilibria in a 
model like that of Azariadis involves agents 
insuring against the risk of being born in an 
undesirable sunspot state. Suppose that one 
opens markets for all contingent claims, but 
only allows trading by agents after they 
have been born (and after revelation of the 
sunspot state in their first period of life). In 
this case sunspot equilibria are still possible 
in the Azariadis model; indeed, all of the 
equilibria considered by Azariadis still exist. 
One needs only to work out a set of contin- 
gent claims prices at which no agents who 
are allowed to wish to trade these claims 
(starting from one of Azariadis' sunspot al- 
location). This is easily done, since in the 
case of any two contingent claims, there is at 
most one type of agent who consumes in 
both states. Thus sunspot equilibria are con- 
sistent with trading in contingent claims after 
birth, and this kind of trading is the only 
kind whose absence could represent an unex- 
ploited profit opportunity in a model of this 
type. 
Another kind of economy in which sun- 
spot equilibria may exist even in the case of 
trading in claims contingent upon sunspot 
histories is a cash-in-advance monetary econo- 
my of the sort studied by Robert Lucas and 
Nancy Stokey (1987). Suppose that an in- 
finite lived representative agent seeks to 
maximize the expected value of 
00 
E A [u(ct) - v(ntfl, 
t =1 
where nt is output supplied for sale in period 
t, and ct is goods purchased in period t. 
Goods purchases are subject to a cash-in- 
advance constraint, so that income from 
supply of output can only be spent in the 
following period. Let us suppose that the 
money supply is increased at a constant rate 
g (the per capita money supply in period 
t +1 is g times that in period t), and that 
additions to the money supply each period 
are through lump sum transfers (or taxes if 
g < 1) that add to (or subtract from) the 
money balances from which agents can 
finance goods purchases in that period. Now 
let z^ denote the solution to u'(z^) = v'(z^), 
that is, the level of per capita real balances 
at which the cash-in-advance constraint 
ceases to bind. Then a rational expectations 
equilibrium is a stochastic process for per 
capita real balances zt that satisfies 
(1) F(zt) = (f3/g)Et[G(zt+j)] 
and a transversality constraint, where 
F(z) zv'(min(z^, z)), 
G(z) zu'(min(z2, z)). 
Given any such process for zt, the equi- 
librium allocation of resources is given by 
ct =nt= min(z, zt). 
Difference equation (1) is of the same 
form as the equilibrium condition consid- 
ered by Azariadis, and the methods of that 
paper can be used to show that stationary 
sunspot equilibria are possible in a Lucas- 
Stokey economy. (Any finite-state Markov 
process solution to (1) necessarily satisfies 
the transversality condition as well; see 
my paper 1986c.) In fact, in the case of 
equilibria in which the cash-in-advance con- 
straint always binds (zt < Z always), the 
equilibria of the Lucas-Stokey model just 
described are identical to those of an over- 
lapping generations model of the Azariadis 
type in which agents born in period t seek to 
maximize Et[I3u(ct,?)- v(nt)]. 
The existence of sunspot equilibria in this 
model depends upon market incompleteness, 
because of the argument given above; but it 
does not depend upon the absence of trading 
in claims contingent upon sunspot histories. 
In fact, one can introduce markets for such 
claims without changing the set of equilibria 
at all. Following Lucas and Stokey, let each 
period be divided into two subperiods. In 
the first subperiod, financial markets are 
open, in which spot money is traded against 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Thu, 21 Nov 2013 16:44:30 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
VOL. 77 NO. 2 MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN MACROECONOMICS 95 
obligations to pay money in the future, which 
may be contingent upon future sunspot 
realizations. In the second subperiod, goods 
markets are open, in which goods may be 
purchased using money held at the end of 
the first subperiod. We suppose that the 
sunspot state is revealed at the beginning of 
the first subperiod. Lucas and Stokey show 
that the equilibria of this model with a com- 
plete set of contingent claims markets of this 
sort are identical to those of the model with 
no financial markets described above. (They 
do not explicitly consider sunspot states, but 
their analysis applies equally to this case.) 
Thus it is the cash-in-advance constraint 
that plays the crucial role in allowing sun- 
spot equilibria in this model, not any absence 
of trading in claims contingent upon sunspot 
realizations. Of course, it is appropriate to 
scrutinize the microeconomic foundations of 
the cash-in-advance constraint, and ask why 
it is that no agent has an incentive to engage 
in financial innovation that would relax that 
constraint. But there is no reason to expect 
that the existence of sunspot fluctuations of 
a substantial magnitude should greatly 
change such incentives from what they are in 
the case of, say, the quantity-theoretic equi- 
librium in which prices increase at the con- 
stant rate g. Accordingly, it does not seem 
that the existence of sunspot equilibria must 
necessarily involve any opportunity to profit 
through opening new markets, that should 
be expected to suppress such equilibria. 
II. Can Sunspot Theories Yield 
Useful Predictions? 
Another general objection to sunspot equi- 
libria as positive models of economic fluc- 
tuations would argue that models in which 
equilibrium is indeterminate (as is true of all 
sunspot models) are by that virtue models 
that yield few definite predictions. It might 
also be argued that insofar as it is impossible 
to perform comparative statics analysis of 
the effects of policy interventions with a 
model in which equilibrium is indeterminate, 
acceptance of such models means abandon- 
ment of any hope of using economic theory 
as a guide for policymaking. Accordingly, 
some would reject sunspot equilibria as posi- 
tive models in all cases. Either, they would 
argue, one should only propose as candidate 
models of the economy models in which 
equilibrium is determinate; or one should try 
to reduce the set of equilibria in order to 
sharpen the prediction of one's model, by, 
for example, ruling out all equilibria in which 
sunspot variables matter. 
There are a number of possible responses 
to this objection. First, the mere fact that 
one model has a unique equilibrium does 
not mean that it yields sharper predictions 
than another model with multiple equilibria; 
it depends upon how many " unobserved 
shock" terms are postulated by the first 
model. (See my papers, 1986a; 1987, sec. 4, 
for demonstrations that sunspot models can 
yield many quite specific predictions regard- 
ing the character of equilibrium fluctuations.) 
If fluctuations were to be explained as en- 
tirely due to shifts in observed exogenous 
variables in a model with a determinate equi- 
librium, exact comovements of the various 
variables of the model would be implied, of 
a kind that are in fact not observed. Hence 
all econometric models allow for a large 
number of unobserved shocks to various 
equations of the model; and in traditional 
macroeconometric models, such equation re- 
siduals account for more of the variability of 
the endogenous variables than do shifts in 
observed exogenous variables. Replacing 
simple equation residuals by explicit shocks 
to tastes and the like does not greatly in- 
crease the extent to which such models can 
be said to truly explain economic fluctua- 
tions, since these shocks only fulfill their 
function of rendering nonsingular the pre- 
dicted covariance matrix of the data insofar 
as the existence of the shocks cannot be 
independently observed. A sunspot theory 
that predicts a nonsingular covariance ma- 
trix (under certain conditions, whose validity 
may itself be tested) without the need to 
postulate such shocks might well be con- 
sidered a less ad hoc "theory of the error 
term." 
Moreover, it may be argued that the very 
fact that equilibrium is indeterminate in cer- 
tain economic models, so that revisions of 
expectations may be self-fulfilling, is itself a 
prediction of great importance; the fact that 
sunspot equilibria exist in certain models and 
not in others allows one to make predictions 
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about the degree of instability that should be 
associated with different economic struc- 
tures, assuming similar levels of variability 
in "fundamentals." Predictions of this kind 
could be tested by comparing the experience 
of different countries and different historical 
periods with differing regulatory and policy 
regimes. For example, many recent applica- 
tions of the concept of sunspot equilibrium 
draw attention to the role of certain types of 
financial institutions in allowing equilibrium 
fluctuations of this type. Douglas Diamond 
and Philip Dybvig (1983) link the possibility 
of bank runs due to purely extrinsic uncer- 
tainty to particular features of demand de- 
posit contracts, and show how particular 
institutional arrangements, such as deposit 
insurance or suspension of convertibility in 
certain circumstances, can suppress such 
equilibria. Bruce Smith (1986) exhibits an 
economy in which sunspot fluctuations are 
possible in the case of free banking, but can 
be suppressed by regulations that restrict 
inside money creation, and compares his re- 
sults to nineteenth-century British debates 
about banking instability. My papers (1986a, 
1987) show that cyclic fluctuations in invest- 
ment may occur as a sunspot phenomenon 
in an economy in which restrictions upon 
the ability of wage earners to borrow against 
future wage income coexist with an elastic 
supply of bank loans to entrepreneurs; either 
an improvement in the availability of con- 
sumer credit or control of the nominal 
volume of bank loans to entrepreneurs can 
suppress such fluctuations. Results of this 
kind provide a potential basis for interesting 
historical and international comparisons. 
Furthermore, predictions of this kind may 
be useful for policy analysis insofar as ren- 
dering equilibrium determinate and sup- 
pressing sunspot fluctuations may itself be 
an object of policy. Determinacy of equi- 
librium is then not necessary in order for 
economic theory to be useful for the evalua- 
tion and design of public policy; and assum- 
ing away multiple equilibria, arguing that the 
sunspot equilibria are not "economically rel- 
evant," may mean throwing away the pre- 
diction of one's model that is of greatest 
importance. 
As an example of what may be missed in 
policy analysis that ignores the existence 
of sunspot equilibria, consider again the 
Lucas-Stokey model, and suppose that the 
monetary authority contemplates a change 
in the rate of growth of the money supply. 
To each value of g between /B and some 
(possibly infinite) upper bound, there corre- 
sponds a unique quantity-theoretic equi- 
librium in which prices grow at the constant 
rate g and output never varies. If one simply 
compares the welfare of the representative 
agent across these deterministic steady states, 
one finds that welfare is monotonically de- 
creasing in g, so that one should seek to 
reduce g to be as close to /3 as possible 
(Friedman's "optimum quantity of money"). 
On the other hand, as noted above, there 
may exist sunspot equilibria in this model, 
and changing g can affect whether the econ- 
omy is unstable in this sense. (Let us assume 
that the government has adopted policies of 
the sort discussed by W. A. Brock and J. A. 
Scheinkman, 1980, in order to rule out equi- 
libria in which per capita real balances ever 
become extremely large or extremely small; 
in the absence of such policies, for many 
kinds of preferences it turns out that hyper- 
inflationary sunspot equilibria exist for all 
rates of money growth consistent with the 
existence of any monetary equilibrium, for 
the reason discussed by those authors.) One 
often finds (see my 1986c paper) that sun- 
spot equilibria exist for low, rather than high, 
values of g -exactly the values of g that 
would be considered most desirable if only 
the welfare properties of the steady state are 
considered. The intuition is simple. A condi- 
tion like (1) has sunspot solutions in which 
zt remains forever bounded above and away 
from zero only if a change in the expected 
value of zt+l has sufficiently strong effect 
upon the equilibrium value of zt; and for 
any given slopes for the F and G functions, 
a lower value of g means a larger effect of 
any given change in expectations regarding 
Zt+j upon the right-hand side of (1), and 
hence a larger change in zt is required to 
reestablish equilibrium. Thus a lower value 
of g strengthens the destabilizing positive 
feedback loop from expectations of price 
level volatility to actual price level volatility. 
My 1986c paper also shows that the ex- 
pected utility of the representative agent in a 
stationary sunspot equilibrium associated 
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with a low value of g can be lower than the 
utility obtained in the unique equilibrium 
(the quantity-theoretic steady state) associ- 
ated with a higher value of g, even though 
the level of utility in the steady state associ- 
ated with the low value of g is higher. Hence 
if one were to assume that when g is low 
enough for nonexplosive sunspot equilibria 
to exist, the economy will in fact move to an 
equilibrium of this sort, then decreasing g to 
this point would decrease the welfare of the 
representative agent. If one were to suppose 
that when rational expectations equilibrium 
ceases to be unique, agents are unlikely to be 
able to coordinate their expectations upon 
any equilibrium at all, the consequences of 
too low a rate of money growth could be 
even worse. 
III. Could Agents Ever Come to Have 
such Expectations? 
If, however, the existence of sunspot equi- 
libria as a theoretical possibility gave one no 
reason to believe that agents would be any 
less likely to coordinate their expectations 
upon one of the nonsunspot equilibria, there 
would be no reason to design institutional 
structures or stabilization policies so as to 
suppress the sunspot equilibria. A final gen- 
eral objection to sunspot equilibria as a posi- 
tive model of economic fluctuations argues 
that it is implausible that agents should ever 
come to have the expectations associated 
with a sunspot equilibrium. For it becomes 
rational for agents to respond at all to the 
realizations of a sunspot variable only after a 
large part of the population already re- 
sponds to that variable, and all in the same 
way. One may wonder how such a coherent 
pattern of response could ever get started. 
My 1986b paper explicitly models a pro- 
cess by which agents might decide whether 
and how to respond to sunspot realizations, 
using historical experience to determine the 
information content of such realizations, in 
the case of the Azariadis model. Because of 
the formal analogy discussed above, the re- 
sults are also immediately applicable to the 
model of Lucas and Stokey as well. It is 
assumed that agents observe a finite-state 
Markov process sunspot variable, and enter- 
tain the hypothesis that the current sunspot 
state might be of use in predicting the rate of 
inflation between the current period and the 
next. It is also assumed that they use the 
observed sample distribution of rates of in- 
flation, when the current sunspot state has 
occurred in the past, as their estimate of the 
distribution of possible rates of inflation in 
the current instance. Under such a learning 
procedure, it is possible for the quantity-the- 
oretic steady state to be unstable, and for 
stationary sunspot equilibria to be locally 
stable. In fact, in the case of the policy 
experiment described above, it is easy to 
exhibit examples in which, for all values of g 
above a critical growth rate, the steady state 
is the unique equilibrium and is stable under 
the learning dynamics, while for all values of 
g between /B and the critical growth rate, the 
steady state is unstable and there exist two 
stationary sunspot equilibria, both of which 
are locally stable. Hence learning dynamics 
of this sort are consistent with the conclu- 
sion above that reducing g can destabilize 
the steady-state equilibrium so as to generate 
fluctuations that reduce expected utility to a 
level below that associated with the higher 
rate of money growth. 
This analysis shows that agents need not 
begin with an expectation of exactly the 
pattern of response associated with a sun- 
spot equilibrium in order for such an equi- 
librium to come about, assuming that all 
agents happen to be paying attention to the 
same sunspot variable. It does not, however, 
solve the problem of the large number of 
sunspot variables that agents might equally 
well pay attention to. In fact, in order for the 
quantity-theoretic steady state to be unsta- 
ble, it is necessary that a sufficiently large 
fraction of the population all be using the 
same sunspot variable to forecast with; there 
must be something especially salient about 
that particular variable, in order to justify a 
large enough number of agents' paying at- 
tention to it for the positive feedback to be 
strong enough to create self-justifying fluc- 
tuations. 
Perhaps the most likely case is that in 
which the variable in question is not a pure 
sunspot variable at all, but rather a very 
small shock to fundamentals. There may be 
multiple rational expectations equilibria, in 
all of which agents respond only to this real 
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shock; and some may involve a response 
quite out of proportion to the magnitude of 
the real shock. Equilibria of the latter sort 
are examples of instability due to self-fulfill- 
ing expectations, as much as are sunspot 
equilibria proper; indeed, sunspot equilibria 
may be usefully viewed as simply a limiting 
(and especially dramatic) case of "over- 
response" of this sort. 
The conditions under which stationary 
sunspot equilibria exist in the Azariadis 
model or the Lucas-Stokey model imme- 
diately translate (via a continuity argument) 
into conditions under which there exist equi- 
libria exhibiting over-response to real shocks. 
Furthermore, the results concerning stability 
of learning dynamics immediately translate 
as well into conditions under which the equi- 
librium with a small response to the shocks 
is unstable and equilibria involving over- 
response are locally stable. In such a case 
there is no mystery about why agents should 
all come to use that particular state variable 
in forecasting; agents must respond to the 
variable in any rational expectations equi- 
librium. Then the finding that learning dy- 
namics can lead agents away from the equi- 
librium in which small shocks to fundamen- 
tals have only a small effect indicates that 
self-fulfilling revisions of expectations may 
be a realistic source of economic instability. 
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